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CRIMINOLOGY AND A MODERN PENAL CODE*
JEROME HALLt
Of all types of group behavior, law-making is one of the most
deliberate. In law, therefore, the application of knowledge to
human affairs should find an especially apt field of inquiry. As in
many discussions of relationships between knowledge and group
conduct, certain ideas and assumptions are implicit in the following
namely: that there are "social problems"; that their solution is
desired; and that in worth-while measure they can be solved by
action based upon knowledge.
Especially since the English Utilitarians, laws have been sharply
differentiated from objectives fixed non-legally-by political, ethical
and social considerations. Jhering's contribution to this ideology
emphasized social ends and social utility, and may be said to have
introduced a series of premises into legislation and adjudication that
led to results not attainable, at least so perceptibly, by the earlier
Utilitarian formulas, couched, for the most part, in individualistic
terms. But Jhering's writing is largely vitiated by his pervasive
analogyzing of an evolutionary, transcendental, "universal purpose"
which determined human motivation as inexorably as physical
"causation" was then conceived to operate. Individualistic Utilitarianism and socio-teleological determinism have given way to an
instrumentalism that builds upon both, but rejects those positions
that are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of social problemsolving stated above. Instrumentalism, alone, does not provide an
adequate perspective from which to view the problems to be dealt
with.' But to some extent it does facilitate analysis of the relationships between law and social problems.
Bentham first applied Utilitarianism to the criminal law-its
precise penalties nursing the post-Newtonian hope (Hutcheson,
Hume, Helvetius, Beccaria, et at.) of constructing an exact "moral
science." Thoughtful persons have largely rejected 18th century
* This paper was presented on December 27, 1935, at the annual meeting of the
American Sociological Society, Section on Criminology.
t Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Louisiana State University Law
School.
1 Instrumentalism has aptly been called a "governmental view of truth" (B.
Russell). In the solution of practical political problems, the conception is helpful.
But we need to reject the inhuman and perverse implications of instrumentalism
applied directly to human beings.

2

JEROME HALL

penology. But the problems that challenge knowledge of human
affairs can again find no more fruitful field of inquiry than in the
criminal law.
The focus of our problem is a penal code. Such a code consists
chiefly of propositions (rules) of distinctive character. 2 Recent
analytical jurists, qualifying the Austinian conception of legal
rules as "commands," insist that such rules are "norms." They
state that rules of law are prescriptions, not descriptions; that they
do not, like empirical generalizations, describe what Is, but that
they prescribe what Ought to be; that they do not deal with fact
or nature or existence of any sort, but that, on the contrary, they
are ideals deriving validity only from their formal inter-relationship; and that, accordingly, in law, Ought has no ethical connotation, but is, instead, a characteristic of certain propositions constructed within an independent epistemological category.
From the legislator's (any "manipulator's") point of view, however, characterization of rules of law either as "commands" or as
"norms" is indiscriminate. From this viewpoint, at least, it is necessary to distinguish two divisions of each rule. With reference to
criminal law, we may (building upon Kelsen) term these divisions,
respectively, the behavior-circumstance element and the treatmentconsequence element. The treatment-consequence element prescribes the penalty. It is the familiar sanction. It supplies the
normative character of legal rules. But the behavior-circumstance
element, whatever the form in which it may be cast, is a general
description of recurring fact.3
Now it is this latter element of the rules that is referred to
when it is stated that one important function of criminologists in
their collaboration on a modern penal code, will be to help "define" crimes. It may be readily seen, however, that "definition"
is an inapt term. In a narrow sense, definition means a set of symbols stated as premises, which need to be applied consistently in
a discussion. Ordinarily definition presupposes existing and adequate knowledge, i. e., it consists of brief exposition of the unknown
2 There are also definitions of terms, propositions that are purely descriptive
and impose no duty on any person, etc. With these we are not here concerned.
3 It is possible to view the treatment-consequence element similarly upon the
hypothesis that officials act in certain typical ways. This is not attempted here
partly because of the particular question under discussion, i. e., anti-social behavior; partly because we approach the problem from the viewpoint of the legislator, administrator and judge; quite naturally, deterministic hypotheses recede,
and treatment is viewed as deliberate, and largely unconditioned conduct. From
this point of view, the conduct of officials is purposive rather than merely existential. This is discussed further in the text.
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in terms of the known. But the very opposite must be presupposed
in the search for correct answers to social problems. "Definition"
here develops progressively in the course of painstaking research.
Such definition is constructed upon discoveries regarding anti-social
conduct which, finally, permit the filling in of the behavior-circumstance element of legal rules with content that is "correct" (defensible) in light of present knowledge and present problems.
Criminology includes existing knowledge of crimes defined in
terms that denote certain social phenomena; and it includes various
methods and techniques of research available for further acquisition
of such knbwledge.
But something other than criminology, thus defined, is needed
for the construction of a modem penal code. For we are here
concerned with the relationships of criminology to law. We seek
knowledge regarding the correct content of legal rules, and regarding correct administration of such rules. In the case of major
offenses, to be sure, criminologists study phenomena described or
indicated by the behavior-circumstance element of legal rules. But
the coincidence has not been shown to be a necessary one. And,
as regards a vast number of minor offenses, it is clear that there is
no necessary relationship between legal and social criminality.
Hence it is preferable to reserve the term "criminology" for knowledge and study of certain social phenomena without regard to penal
laws. Accordingly, the term "sociology of criminal law" will be
used to refer to the specific relationships that here concern us.
The sociology of criminal law is by no means mere juxtaposition of criminology and criminal law-although it presupposes
knowledge of both disciplines. We are familiar with discussions of
pressure groups, of social and economic forces that influence legislation, of psychologic drives that affect judicial decision, and so on.
But most of these essays, whatever else they may be, cannot constitute the distinctive field of sociology of law since they completely
4
ignore legal rules.
The basic hypothesis upon which a sociology of law rests is that
rules are potent, conditioning factors as regards the conduct both
of lay population and officials-that rules make a difference that
is "sufficient" in degree and importance to engage serious intellectual interest.' A further necessary hypothesis is that the con4 And no description of official or other conduct has been presented which
.
permits study of "law" as distinctive behavior.
5 Obviously this does not mean that the rules are administered exactly as
written. Nor does it mean that the rules are not radically modified, sometimes
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tents of rules are more or less correct or incorrect-depending, in
part, upon criteria of correctness established in certain fields of
empirical knowledge. So, too, as regards administration of the
rules whether by police or judges or peno-correctional officials. A
third fundamental hypothesis is that the purpose of rules is the
influencing of human conduct towards socially desirable ends. A
sociology of law, when constructed, will be a theoretical social
science consisting of generalizations regarding social phenomena
insofar as they refer to the contents, purposes, applications, and
effects of legal rules.6
How shall we set about to construct such a discipline, or, more
specifically and narrowly, to make the discoveries regarding antisocial behavior that are needed for sound definition of crimes (behavior-circumstance elements of penal rules) ? Theoretically there
are two approaches to the problem-stated as extremes: to study
anti-social behavior in complete disregard of penal law; or, to study
the behavior described or indicated by existing rules of law. Persistent application of purely non-legal criteria of criminality would
be tremendously valuable for criminology. But the other approach
would seem generally to offer the greater, and certainly the more
direct, advantage for present purposes. Besides, many acts made
criminal by law are of very ancient vintage. They occur as behavior-circumstances in numerous codes.7 If, in such cases, we
may to some extent be unavoidably influenced by existing legal
conceptions, then it is necessary to be thoroughly conscious of that
influence. We must know as fully and as precisely as possible what
the present rules are. Hence, though for different reasons, analysis
of the rules is important in either approach.
even ignored, where they lag far behind the needs arising from present social
problems. It does not mean that there are not other conditioning factors. A
persistent need is for differentiation of litigated from non-litigated situations, for
differentiation of rules and situations that can be specifically objectified, from
necessarily amorphous rules and situations, etc. Current psychological literature
on concept formation and concept adherence and departure is relevant.
6 Hence while continued research in criminal law (rules) and in criminology,
carried on in separate compartments, may help, it does not directly add to the

kind of knowledge that is needed. Even though the drafting of a modern penal
code may need to be long deferred, none the less, if the analysis above presented
is sound, every contribution to a sociology of criminal law, whether by independent scholars or by groups of collaborating scholars, will mark an advance
in the necessary direction.
7 As to limitations upon social research resulting from acceptance of the legal
definition of crime, see Some Basic Problems in Criminology (1933) 167 Annals of

Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 131-2.
And cf. footnote 6 supra. Hence, in any event, it would at some point, be
essential to focus research and discovery upon rules of law.
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But the existing rules should provide no more than startingpoints to assist projection of the lines of empirical research. To
begin with phenomena described in existing rules does not in the
least mean that research is to be confined within these limits. It
does not mean that there will be the slightest limitation upon the
study of offenders, or of recurrent patterns of their behavior (prcrfessionalism). Nor does it mean that we shall not emerge with a
new and distinctive penal code. Moreover, this method will avoid
dogmatism. It will be possible to trace the process step by step
which led from the existing rules to the ones discovered. Projection
of research from existing behavior-circumstances will encourage
narrow formulation of problems. Accumulation of the knowledge
thus acquired can lead to broader generalizations whose validity
will rest upon a carefully wrought foundation. Hence the tremendous importance of specific discoveries resulting from painstaking
research should be apparent.
There is another aspect of the definition problem which is of
the utmost importance. A penal code consists of words, phrases,
and propositions-all concepts of various degrees of generality.
Accordingly, we have to deal, also, with concept-formulation as a
linguistic problem. Its solution requires an understanding of the
"referents" (Ogden and Richards) discovered by crirninologic research, as well as an understanding of the linguistic requirements
of the criminal law-to invent adequate symbols. These latter requirements are technical ones. They involve phenomena that can
be studied independently as self-sustaining and self-perpetuating.
The language of our law was not always technical. Pick up any
of the early mediaeval codes and you read words of common usage
throughout. Note, for example, the following dooms of the AngloSaxon king, Aethelberht: "If one man slays another on the king's
premises, he shall pay fifty shillings compensation; for seizing a
man by the hair fifty sceattas shall be paid as compensation; if the
hearing of either ear is destroyed, twenty-five shillings shall be
paid as compensation; if an ear is struck off, twelve shillings shall
be paid as compensation; if an ear is pierced, three shillings shall
be paid as compensation; if an ear is lacerated, six shillings shall
be paid as compensation." 8 The specificity of these provisions, both
as to behavior-circumstanices and treatment-consequences-the latter frequently stated in exact quantitative terms-is one striking
characteristic of early law.
s F. L. Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest English Kings, (1922).
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More noteworthy for present purpose, is the total lack of definition of any of the terms used. It is assumed that the meanings of
"steal," "slay," "property," and so on, are known. For the most
part we find much simpler concepts that are barely more than descriptions of specific situations (images); e. g., "lacerate nose,"
"pierce cheek," "knock eye out," "seize hair," "break skull," "strike
off thumb," etc. The referents were simple and well known; the
symbols were words of common usage, commonly interpreted.
Conspicuous in modern penal statutes is the profusion of tautology, obscurity, and inconsistency; also, of technicality-e. g., felony, misdemeanor, mens tea, trespass, and so on. Thirdly, there
are numerous, apparently popular words which have been given
technical meanings. Thus in legal definitions of murder, we note
such terms as "malice" and "premeditate." But we discover very
soon that "malice" does not necessarily mean spite 'or wickedness
in any degree; and that "premeditate" may mean much less than
"meditate." Explanations of these various linguistic phenomena,
non-technical and technical, may include such diverse ones as that
in terms of growth of language viewed as an autonomous institution; of the eccentricity, perverseness, even chicanery, of professionals; and, not least, of motivation towards socially desirable ends,
unsupported by research or analysis of proposed laws in relation
to existing ones.
Elsewhere I have discussed the use of fiction and the deliberate
invention of technicality to diminish the lag between rules and social
problems. 9 Here it needs to be emphasized that the result of such
manipulation is new content poured into old receptacles. The function of fiction is to change the real referents of rules while preserving their conceptual forms.
It would be leaving a mistaken impression, however, if it were
concluded from the above that all technicalities must be eliminated.
Legal science, like any other, depends considerably upon a technical
vocabulary-in its best sense. Technical terms are frequently tools
of analysis essential to the understanding and manipulation of a
complex legal structure. Again, they result unavoidably, to some
extent, from complexity of culture. And, as has been suggested,
they frequently function as administrative devices, created out of
social need, in modern legal systems that operate by use of official
discretion to discharge rigidly prescribed duties.
Differentiation of useful technicalities from mere vestiges and
9 Theft, Law and Society (1935) Chapter three; also pp. 254-268.
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from terms that carry ambiguous or artificial connotations must, in

part, be determined by intensive research into the social problems
that arise in modern conditions. Discovery of typical behavior
configurations, selection of the important referents, consideration of
the problems of proof and of the technical requirements of our legal
structure-all of these factors must engage intensive study at the
hands of groups of specialists. Their efforts should be co-ordinated
in terms of knowledge of the problems-to-be-solved as social problems-with legal concepts constructed always with a view to their
important, auxiliary functions.
It will be seen that perhaps the most important contribution
which the criminologist can make is discovery of recurrent, antisocial behavior. The creative synthesis and generalizing required
are common to all scientific discovery. But because reduction of
descriptions of social phenomena to common or quantitative terms
is usually at the cost of adequate representation of significant empirical differences, we may not discover laws that lend themselves
helpfully to logical or mathematical manipulation. ° Hence we may
be unable, permanently perhaps, to systematize the generalizations
discovered. But that uniformities in criminal behavior and in the
relationships of such behavior to environment have been and can
be discovered is clear. These discoveries by criminologists will, as
indicated, be translated into terms that are in conformity with
legal, linguistic requirements.
As noted, sound definition of the behavior-circumstances of
legal rules depends largely upon research into all the parallel social
processes."' What, now, of Administration? Whereas the rules
contain abstractions of significant features of recurrent behavior,
each case presents a specific situation. Hence Administration is
the process of applying generalizations to concrete situations. Individualization of punishment means, in these terms, the discovery
10 Cf. "In regard to his subject matter, on the other hand, the physicist has
to limit himself very severely: He must content himself with describing the most
simple events which can be brought within the domain of our experience; all
events of a more complex order are beyond the power of the human intellect to
reconstruct with the subtle accuracy and logical perfection which the theoretical
physicist demands. Supreme purity, clarity and certainty at the cost of completeness." Albert Einstein, The World as I See It (1934) 21.
IMr. Justice Cardozo, in his paper, What Medicine Can. Do for Law, points
to legislation limiting the hours of labor, of night work for women, to compuEory
vaccination, and the tuberculin test for cattle, as examples of the effect upon law
of "fuller knowledge of the investigations, of scientists and social workers." Law
and Literature, pp. 75, 77.
For a remarkably suggestive article, see Yandell Henderson, Science, Law
and Alcohol, Harper's, June, 1933.
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within the abstract, treatment consequence prescription, of the
correct concrete sanction to be applied to a specific individual. 2
The assumption throughout is that the present concrete situation falls within the- prescribed generalization. But that hypothesis
has for some years proved inadequate either to explain judicial
decision, viewed from without, or to guide the judges themselves.
Acceleration of social change has been so rapid, at least since the
Industrial Revolution, that by hardly any stretch of imagination can
many concrete situations or present knowledge regarding them be
subsumed under rules formulated for a culture distinctly different
from our present one. Hence it has long been recognized that the
courts constantly legislate; and it seems a clear understatement to
assert that such legislation is enacted only "interstitially," at least
so far as the criminal law is concerned.
As legislator, the judge's task is, in part, that of the criminologist. He needs to understand many social problems in all their.
ramifications. He needs a degree of sophistication regarding the
social sciences generally, to enable him, not to dispense with expert
knowledge, but to evaluate such knowledge critically. Passing over
the problem of personnel-the needs of which, as regards criminal
law administration, are rather obvious-we must note that even the
ablest scholar on the bench is, under our system, enormously handicapped through lack of information and analyses of the factual
problems which confront him. Accordingly one of the greatest
needs of our times is provision for permanent research institutes
as recognized adjuncts to courts and legislatures. 13 As regards both
divisions of legal rules, one persistent quest of draftsmen who
wished to build upon the work of such an institute would bewhat formulation of them will permit the fullest utilization of
knowledge?
But there is another, equally persistent, equally important
problem. Consideration of the treatment-consequence element from
the law-making point of view, discloses the purposive, normative
aspect of law. Hence the problem of the legislator includes not
I2 Obviously the practice would change radically if an administrative board

took over the entire functions of sentencing and treatment. The legal theory
would remain essentially the same; it would include application of a long series
of "sanctions"-which, if legal, would be administered under a law more general
than the totality of actual treatments ("sanctions").
13 Cf. Sheldon Glueck, The Social Sciences and Scientific Method in the Administration of Justice (1933) 167 Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. at 116. The

term "Ministry of Justice" does not seem apt since it suggests the continental
control of judiciary.
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only scientific generalization regarding existing social facts; it includes also thinking in terms of the accomplishment of certain ends
by appropriate means. Such purposive functioning is directed
towards the discovery of solutions to social problems. In this aspect
the distinctions that have frequently been drawn between law that
Is and law that Ought to be are purely formal ones. But the Ought
that is relevant to solution of social problems is not a purely ethical
Ought, nor, indeed, is it any logical Ought. It is, instead, the correct solution of existing social problems. Now it is the distinctive
character of such problems (viewed not historically, i. e., after the
outcomes ("solutions") are known, but viewed as existing problems), that the answers ("Oughts") are unknown. The agent has
some knowledge, but not enough. He has some sense of what the
desirable end or ends should be, but his understanding in that
regard is vague and uncertain. So too, as regards effective means.
Social problem-solving is a process that consists of increasing his
knowledge, and, at the same time, of discovering particularobjectives and the.particularmeans to their attainment.
In this connection it needs to be pointed out that the formulation of broad generalizations as ends, though acquiesed in by most
persons, provides not the slightest aid in solution of social problems.
Such notions as "welfare," "the public good," "the protection of
society," and so forth, may be set down on paper; and it is rather
simple to subsume a large number of propositions that are formally
consistent with the initial generalization. But since such generalities can include almost any actual content imaginable, they include
nothing of value in social problem-solving. (Where such slogans
are adequate, does any social problem exist?) The discovery of
specific ends and means is, indeed, inconsistent with acceptance of
broad generalizations as already representing desirable ends and
means. Realization of the nature of legal rules and their administration, and of present, social problem-solving, as dependent upon
discovery of specific ends and means, places the emphasis where
it needs to be placed, namely, upon the most detailed empirical
research possible by the most creative minds that can be enlisted."4
14 "No amount of mere fact-finding develops science nor the scientific attitude
in either physics or social affairs. Facts merely amassed and piled up are dead;
a burden which only adds to confusion. When ideas, hypotheses, begin to play
upon facts, when they are methods for experimental use in action, then light
dawns; then it becomes possible to discriminate significant from trivial facts, and
relations take the place of isolated scraps." John Dewey, Science and Society in
Philosophy and Civilization (1931) at 329.
And for an indefinite future, as regards increase of social science here and
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The nature of legislation and adjudication and of legal rules
viewed as implements to such functioning, makes it necessary to
consider, also, the meaning of social values as they affect a sociology
of criminal law. The distinction to be stressed here is that between
ethics, and the study of moral ideas or attitudes. There is, no doubt,
a defensible empirical explanation for the origin of both. But ethics,
as here limited, is concerned with the validity of moral judgments,
the assumptions underlying them, and their relationship to certain
standards or premises. On the other hand, moral ideas can be
studied empirically, i. e., as to their actual content, the psychological
forces underlying them, their differences in various cultures, their
social functions, and so on.
The criminologist should be concerned primarily with the empirical study of moral ideas. (Indeed, crimes as social phenomena,
in part, mean attitudes and expressions of disapproval.) If moral
ideas are viewed as facts which operate in reactions against persons and conduct deemed anti-social, then the ethical validity of
such ideas is of no consequence so far as criminologic research is
concerned. They must be accepted without bias as elements in the
factual set-up with which the scientist must deal, however superficial or distasteful they may be.
One of the most striking defects of contemporary criminology
results from neglect of study of the mores in their special relationships to socially criminal behavior. This results from at least partial acceptance of the legal conception of crimes as violations of
penal law. Consequently the criminologist focuses upon the offense
and upon the offender in such isolation from group reactions as to
preclude the possibility of discovering the nature of socially criminal behavior. This lack of knowledge imposes serious limitations
upon present construction of a sociology of criminal law.
Two further observations must be made to avoid erroneous
impressions from the above. First, moral ideas change; they even
improve. And it is possible to discover points of leverage accessible
to reform. Next, it must be noted that the infiltration of moral
attitudes as an element in the factual set-up does not make research impossible. Social attitudes have persistent aspects. Not
now, reliance must be placed upon common sense science. For a discussion that
common sense is not nearly so different from exact science as is sometimes

imagined, see Emile Myerson, Identity and Reality (1930) Chap XI; and cf. C. I.
Lewis, Mind and the World Order at 397.
And the methods and results of our best research indicate that we must persistently cultivate thinking in terms of multiple causation and multiple effect, and
work out the statistical correlations, so far as possible and meaningful.
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only can they be studied in their overt manifestations like other
recurrent behavior, but they can, also, once known, be fixed as
relatively constant factors in the set-up. The other factors may
then be studied as relevant variables. As a matter of fact, the problems that press for solution are mostly of this latter sort. Thus,
disapproval of receiving stolen property can be studied as a social
attitude, and it may be discovered in a particular locality, that there
is a certain range of intensity-say from that towards professionals
to that towards consumers. 15 The inquiries that require by far
the most study center upon the discovery of typical behavior configurations, the effects of particular laws as regards the crime rates,
convictions, recidivism, and so on-all of which can be brought into
significant relationships with the given social attitudes.
Prevalent moral attitudes largely determine not only what behavior is socially criminal; they determine, also, to a considerable
degree, the treatment that can be accorded offenders. 16 History,
anthropological literature, and observation of contemporary phenomena all support the thesis that socially dangerous behavior sets
off deeply-rooted emotional responses that tend towards overt action
(The situations can be described in terms
against the offenders."
of typical stimulus-response patterns.) Psychiatry and bio-chemistry reenforce the above assertion-the one by analyses of the
affective nature of man, the other by analyses of bio-chemical
changes set off by emotional states.'" And elaborate essays on the
fallacies of the retributive "theory" of punishment are beside the
point.
Strong social disapproval of dangerous persons and of very
injurious behavior is so obvious that to merely state the facts is to
labor the issue. Yet who can read the declamations of many writers on penology and fail to note their utter disregard of prevailing
mores and their persistence? They write as though we can completely ignore the moral attitudes of the general population and
turn loose persons regarded as murderers, rapists, or racketeers.
15 Study of attitudes will be modified as significant behavior differences are
discovered; also, before and after legal enactments. The immediate pressing
needs are not at the extremities, but with reference to the middle area of lesser
felonies and major misdemeanors.
16Cf. Cardozo, What Medicine. Can Do for Law in Law and Literature, 87-88;
and Ulman, The Trial Judge's Dilemma-A Judge's View, in Probation and Criminal Justice (Ed. S. Glueck) 114, 116.
17 It is sufficient for present purposes to confine the thesis to serious attacks
upon the person. I am indulging in some simplification here as to "prevailing
mores"; obviously the problem is complex.
18 Cf. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (1929).
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(The very terms are emotive.) Another fact that cannot be ignored
by social scientists is that there are many thousands of maladjusted,
calloused, dangerous persons in our population who, so far as is
known, cannot be rehabilitated. To term any treatment of such
persons that provides adequate protection, solely "measures of defense" is sheer euphemism. It is certainly punishment to the offender. It is apt to be regarded as punishment-though perhaps,
as being too mild-by large sections of the public.
We must not be content to map out a paper-program, though
it be a logical structure whose harmony delights the aesthetic sense,
or a utopia whose contemplation quells the unrest of reality. It
may be conceded that such programs ultimately have even practical utility by providing ideals that stimulate endeavor. But for
the purpose of drafting a criminal code here and now, such efforts
are largely irrelevant. The briefest study of history-certainly
that of law-shows an amazing inertia, an astounding persistence
of patterns of thought that cannot be ignored by scientists. To say
that a proposed code must be practicable, that its chances for
adoption must be good, is to put the matter superficially. It is the
business of the social scientist to ground his discovery in fact.
Correct norms cannot be spun from thin air. Norms that are discovered and formulated after intensive research will much more
probably bear such a relationship to facts, conditions, knowledge,
and problems that there is some likelihood of their successful
manipulation.
When we contemplate the problem in such general terms, it is
impossible to include the qualifications that need to be made. But
we must never forget that penology has progressed; for example, to
cite an extreme illustration, that indiscriminate executions have
given way-under the humanitarian influence of the Classical
School 1 -to finer instrumentalities, to sounder treatment, and, so
far as one can judge, to better results generally.
19 Bias and lack of understanding are exhibited in much of the current condemnation of the Classical School, and by whole-hog acceptance of the Positivists. We need revision of such criticism to avoid the very evils that the
Positivists sought to overcome, i. e., uncritical acceptance of existing theories.
The Classical School, to be understood, must be viewed partly in light of its
attack upon the inhumanity of the then-existing law. Cf. the writer's paper,
Edward Livingston and His Louisiana Penal Code, Am. Bar Assn. Jour., Mar., 1936.

Much of Ferri's criticism is sheer oratory-anything but scientific analysis.
On the other hand, Ferri, himself, has been misinterpreted by alleged positivists,
as opposed to study of the "offense." The contrary is true. What he objected
to was subservience to existing concepts, to existing definitions of offenses; and
he quite properly insisted upon empirical reseatch.
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All of this points to the need for much more narrow formulation of research and of programs for reform than is customary.
The ultimate results will be none the less far-reaching. The need
is to combine the most careful historical explorations 2 with the
most critical detailed investigations of present situations-studied
at every step in close relationship to narrowly formulated, tentative
hypotheses; to locate areas of flexibility in the existing institutions
that such study-not our hopes-reveals; to insert finer programs
of reform at those points where the state of the mores lend probability to successful manipulation, and to guide them thence in accordance with knowledge, not fancy. We need to persevere through
permanent scientific organization that will envisage the problems
in terms of years, perhaps even, centuries.
The social attitudes that now call insistently for punishment of
serious offenders (and suggest the possibility of their manipulation in further prevention of criminality) present only one aspect
of the limitations imposed upon construction and administration of
a penal code. There are other values which rigorously restrict the
application of science and scientific methods in penology, and in-

deed, in human affairs generally. These limitations have been
aggravated by the necessity to execute the verdicts of ill-equipped
judges and juries who have, on the basis of inadequate facts (e. g.,
exclusion of motive), determined once for all, what treatment shall
be applied.
The result is that we know very little about the rehabilitation
of offenders-except that we have learned that, even in the case of
juveniles, years of maladjustment cannot be obliterated by a few
weeks of treatment; and that catapulting an offender back to his
former environment renders all therapy futile.2 Beneficent results have been achieved by exceptional penologists. But their
knowledge has not been expressed and organized so as to be generally available. Penology is totally unscientific in the sense that
it is generally impossible to predict the results of treatment (which
is not-violation of parole prediction).
Is it far-fetched to suggest that we should encourage develop20 Social science frequently gains in soundness when it is reenforced by an
historical base. We have a laboratory in history far more extensive than any
now available in the contemporary scene. Consider, for example, the transportation of convicts to Australia and their normal adjustment to the new environment,
as this stretch of experience affects the hypothesis of economic conditions as a
factor in criminality.
21See Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, 1000 Juvenile Delinquents.
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ment of a pure science of penology? A science of penology might
call into use every conceivable method of treatment short of annihilation of the "guinea pig." It might apply the most rigorous
treatment to the least offender and fhe very mildest to the most
hardened. Whatever it did, it would proceed in utter disregard of
any objective other than the discovery of the effects of given treatment upon given types of offenders with reference to their behavior following their release-and that would mean much more
than reference to technical recidivism. A purely scientific penologist would be no more concerned for the welfare of his "materials"
than the chemist is for that of the contents of his test tube. A
scientific penology would proceed statistically. It might seek the
destruction of whole neighborhoods and populations root and branch
(on the basis of ecological studies) in utter disregard of such scientific negligibles as individual or social values.
If we choose humanitarism rather than science, do we not concede serious limitations upon discovery, upon techniques of research, and, in its finality, the irrelevance of hypotheses taken bodily
from the sciences of inert phenomena? But the alternative is not
to dismiss entirely the development of a much sounder penology
than now exists. Here, as throughout, it is necessary to push scientific treatment to the utmost limits possible without impairment
of sound social values. In the light of such knowledge as is available, we can, for example, conduct researches similar to those performed by educators in schools (classification of types, "experiment"
and "control" groups, varied programs, testing, etc.). It would be
necessary to record the results with the greatest possible detail, and
to preserve such records indefinitely. 2
It remains to consider a fundamental problem that extends
beyond the scope of traditional penal law. Criminal law (as shown
by the fact that the behavior-circumstance elements of the rules
consist of general descriptions of socially undesirable behavior),
seeks to attain socially desirable conduct by penalizing the contrary of such conduct. Traditionally and today the legal apparatus
functions in the direction of "wrong" behavior. It is a machine of
coercion applied to anti-social conduct. Its product, if any, results
entirely by indirection.
At almost every step there arise limitations on the effectiveness
22 Experimentation upon offenders in institutions would also tend to satisfy
the public demand for (other) punishment, and thus facilitate the creation and
operation of a sentencing board (in lieu of judge and jury) as well as individualized and modified, instead of general and prescribed, treatment.
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of such coercion. The behavior prescribed must take complete
form before officials are permitted to notice what is happening. It
is assumed that the persons enjoined can obey injunctions. The
legal apparatus does not know "conditions." It is not concerned with
behavior as "determined" in any degree. Hence it is not concerned
in any degree with prevention of conditions that are potent factors
in the production of criminality that recurs year by year despite the
application of sanctions. Again, the apparatus operates only upon
the individual who does the wrongful act. It ignores persistent,
habitual patterns of behavior that distinguish professional from
sporadic criminality. And, of course, it cannot exert compulsion
upon the thousands who may not be brought within the net.
Is it possible and desirable to direct the machinery of compulsion
into broader channels? Of inclusion of types of offenders and/or patterns of behavior? Of provision for guidance and training of the maladjusted and the ill-equipped who are brought into court? Of prevention or modification of conditions? Of dealing with groups of
persons inhabiting delinquency areas? Can the gaps between courts
and legislatures be bridged to the end that positive and fartherreaching results are achieved by a reconstructed legal apparatus?
These problems will need the finest legal acumen and craftsmanship. What the criminologist can do is to lay bare the total social
problem and all methods of prevention as well as of treatmentincluding those for which, so far as we know at present, legal instrunentalities cannot be applied. Thus a by-product will be an
inclusive program for full and co-ordinated utilization of all social
agencies-legal and non-legal.
I have attempted to construct a broad frame of reference within
which specific problems can be placed. The classification of offenses on interrelated bases of typical social injuries and typical
offenders (as substitutes for the meaningless, unjust and costly
felony and misdemeanor), the treatment of the mentally diseased,2 3
23 Since McNaughton's Case (1843) the adequacy of the law on insanity has
been much debated. Mr. Justice Cardozo (What Medicine Can Do For Law) and
other lawyers with wide experience in the operation of the rules, have asserted
their dissatisfaction with the present legal tests. Dr. Maudsley's "RapoNsmmynx MEITAL DisEAs" (1874) set the main outlines of the criticism: (1) The legal
tests of responsibility had their origin in the purpose to free from criminal liability all persons who lacked normal capacity. (2) "Capacity" referred to certain facts and to medical and psychological knowledge regarding them. (3) The
legal tests no longer provide adequate reference to existing knowledge of mental
capacity. The criticism of numerous experts indicates that they cannot fully
present existing medical and psychiatric knowledge under present rules. But the
difficulties of adherents of particular schools of psychology should not encourage
uncritical acceptance of their views. Mental disease cannot, like smallpox, be
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of petty offenders against property rights,24 of maladjusted persons
who do not inflict serious social injury (drunkards, prostitutes, drug
addicts, vagrants, etc.), of professional criminality, the provision of
adequate administrative machinery, improved personnel, simplified procedure, and reform of criminal evidence in light of scientific discoveries-these indicate some of the problems.
A sociology of criminal law will extend beyond the problems of
an American Code. The field of comparative criminal law, viewed
not as technical case and statute similarities and differences, but as
phenomena that represent social forces and attempts to solve social
problems in various cultures, awaits sociological research and
analysis. Not the least result of such study, and of the construction of a modern penal code, and of observation of its operation by
a permanent research organization,2 5 should be definite and abundant increase in social science.
identified by pathognomonic symptoms. How to secure the fullest use of the
soundest medical and psychiatric knowledge, is the problem.
24 Cf. the writer's Theft, Law and Society (1935) as illustration, also, of the
general problem of constructing a sociology of criminal law.
25We have been so accustomed to relying upon courts to make laws work
that we have neglected creating and utilizing flexible legislation. Our codes and
statutes, once enacted, are permitted to stand unchanged for generations, until
even the most skilful maneuvers of courts can no longer persuade the population
that dead laws live. The Swedish system of legislation for short periods of time
and improvements resulting from constant observation and study by experts, may
well engage serious attention. This attitude towards legislation supplemented by
permanent research organizations, offers much to all fields of law and to a
sociology of law.

